This paper considers competition in supply functions in a homogeneous goods market in the absence of cost or demand uncertainty. In order to commit to a supply schedule, …rms are required to build su¢ cient capacity to produce any quantity that may be prescribed by that schedule. When the cost of extra capacity (given the level of sales) is strictly positive, any Nash Equilibrium outcome of supply function competition is also a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the corresponding Cournot game, and vice-versa. Conversely, when the cost-savings from reducing output (given the capacity level) are su¢ ciently small, any outcome of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the supply function game is also an outcome of the same process in Cournot, and vice-versa.
2 The Model
Industry
There are n 2 identical …rms operating in a market for a homogeneous good with an inverse demand schedule P : R + ! R + . We assume that P ( ) satis…es P (Q) 0 for all Q 0; and that for all Q 0 such that P (Q) > 0; P ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing, and satis…es the Hahn [1962] condition, i.e.: P 0 (Q) + QP 00 (Q) < 0; for all Q > 0
The …rms'production technology is represented by a cost function C (x; q), where q is the 'installed production capacity' and x is the output actually being produced. We assume that x; q 2 [0;
where q c > 0 is a parameter representing maximum production / capacity. We also use C (q) to denote C (q; q) for short, and assume that this function is twice continuously di¤erentiable and nondecreasing convex, i.e. C 0 (q) > 0 and C 00 (q) > 0 for all q 2 [0; q c ).
In addition to the above assumptions, imposed throughout the paper, two further assumptions will be used interchangeably:
C (x; q) < C (x; q 0 ) for all x; q; q 0 such that x q < q
The second assumption is that the derivative @C=@x = C x (x; q) exists, and: C x (x; q) C x (q c ; q c ) 2 (0; 1) for all x; q such that xc (A2)
Discussion of Assumptions
Let G C denote the associated Cournot game, i.e. one in which …rms simultaneously select quantities q i 2 [0; q c ] ; i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng, and receive payo¤s: c i (q i ; Q i ) = q i P (q i + Q i ) C (q i ) ; Q i = j2N=fig q j Condition (1) is then equivalent to the …rms'individual marginal revenues being decreasing in the rivals'aggregate output Q i . For the production technology speci…ed above, this ensures that the …rms'reaction functions are continuous and downward sloping, so that a Cournot equilibrium exists (see Novshek [1985] ). A su¢ cient condition for (1) to hold is P 00 (Q) 0, i.e. that the demand is concave.
Leaving the Cournot game aside, one may think of C (x; q) as a 'short-run'cost function, in the sense that q, the capacity level, is built in the long-run, using the lowest-cost combination of inputs at the …rm's disposal. The …rm may then adjust the actual level of output x; by revising the chosen amounts of some of the inputs, whilst others are …xed in the short-run and constitute a …xed cost. The resulting (total) cost of producing x is given by C (x; q).
Assumption (A1) states that increasing excess capacity is always costly. Assumption (A2) states that the marginal cost C x (x; q) of an increase in 'short-run'output reducing excess capacity (i.e. of a ceteris paribus increase of x while x q) is at its highest when the capacity q is maximized but excess capacity vanishes (x = q). This would happen when the (ceteris paribus) returns from variable inputs are diminishing, even when the amounts of all inputs are increased in the long-run to allow for a higher capacity. For instance, (A2) holds for a Cobb-Douglas production function exhibiting non-increasing returns to scale. We now proceed to describe the game of supply-function competition, denoted G; as opposed to G C used to denote the Cournot game.
Firm Strategies and the Market Clearing Process
Each …rm i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng simultaneously sets a non-decreasing, right-continuous supply schedule
, specifying the quantity of output it o¤ers to provide at every possible market price, where p = P (0). We will refer to s i ( p) as the 'maximum quantity'of a given schedule. We also restrict attention to pure strategies. For any supply function pro…le s = fs i ( )g i2N , a market price p and a subset of players A N , de…ne the following 'aggregate supply'functions:
Note that for p > 0 the existence of the left-sided limit involved in the above is guaranteed by the monotonicity of each s i ( ) ; and hence the aggregate supply schedule of any subset of players as well: A market-clearing price p (s) must then satisfy:
Due to the monotonicity of S N (s; ) and D ( ), a unique price p 2 [0; p] satisfying (2) always exists. Indeed, consider an alternative price p 2 [0; p] such that p > p ; which implies S N (s; p) S N (s; p ) and D (p) < D (p ) : Thus, it cannot be the case that D (p ) S N (s; p ) and D (p) S N (s; p), so p and p cannot both satisfy (2).
As there is a possibility of excess supply at the market-clearing price p , some …rms may not be able to sell as much as s i (p ) : Let x i (s) s i (p ) denote the quantity of output that …rm i is actually able to sell at market clearing, and note that x i (s) must lie within the following interval:
Observe that when all supply schedules are continuous at p , we have x i (s) = s i (p ), since:
When the supply schedule of at most one …rm (i) is discontinuous at p ; it follows from (2) that: Finally, suppose the supply schedule of more than one …rm is discontinuous at p ; leading to excess supply at p . Let N 0 denote the set of those …rms. Then (3) is a proper interval for all i 2 N 0 (while
The exact value of x i (s) for i 2 N 0 is then determined by a sharing rule, specifying how the D (p ) S N nN 0 (s; p ) part of the demand is to be distributed among the …rms in N 0 . Since the results of this paper turn out to hold for any such sharing rule, it is left unspeci…ed throughout the remainder of the text.
Costs and Payo¤s
With the …rms'sales x i (s) determined, the resulting pro…ts are:
Thus, we assume that, in order to commit to the chosen supply schedule prior to getting to know the market clearing price, the …rm needs to build the capacity required to produce the maximum quantity that may be prescribed by the schedule, s i ( p). Upon discovering that it only needs to produce x i (s) s i ( p), the …rm may recoup some of the cost of its excess capacity s i ( p) x i (s), but the remainder of that cost is sunk. As was suggested in Section 2.1, we may also think of this in terms of 'long-run'(prior to setting the supply schedule) vs. 'short-run'(at market-clearing), where in the latter case some of the input factors are …xed and constitute a sunk cost. Note that this cost speci…cation generalizes the one normally used in the SFC literature, which restricts to cost functions that depend only on actual sales, i.e. ones that satisfy C (x; q) = C (x; q 0 )
for all x; q and q 0 .
Results
The …rst step is to specify a de…nition to help formalize the relationships between the two games: the Cournot game (denoted G C ) and the SFC game (denoted G), both as described in Section 2.
De…nition 3.1 The outcome of a pro…le of quantities q = fq j g j2N in G C is equivalent to the outcome of a pro…le of supply functions s = fs j ( )g j2N in G, when for all i 2 N we have x i (s) = q i and
Note that the fact that x i (s) = q i for all i 2 N also implies that the Cournot market clearing price given q is the same as the SFC market clearing price given s.
Proposition 3.1 Under assumption (A1), and for any pro…le of quantities q = fq j g j2N ; q is a Nash Equilibrium of G C if and only if there exists a pro…le of supply-functions s = fs j ( )g j2N such that s is a Nash Equilibrium of G and the outcome of s in G is equivalent to the outcome of q in G C .
In other words, for every equilibrium of the SFC game there is a corresponding equilibrium of the Cournot game that yields the same outcome (in terms of market prices, outputs and pro…ts), and the converse is also true.
Let us compare this result with those of Delgado and Moreno [2004] (DM). They show that requiring the supply-functions to be non-decreasing means only prices not greater than the Cournot equilibrium price may be sustained (where any SFC equilibrium that yields the Cournot price also exhibits the symmetric Cournot outputs). The assumption of non-decreasing supply-functions has the same e¤ect here, even though, unlike in DM, the supply schedules are not required to be continuous.
The main di¤erence is that in order to eliminate the equilibria that support prices strictly below the Cournot level, DM impose an additional requirement of 'coalition-proofness'on the set of equilibria (which must be invulnerable to improving deviations by any coalition of players). Intuitively, this requirement becomes stronger when the number of players is greater, and when it is su¢ ciently large the only equilibrium outcome that remains is the Cournot outcome.
In contrast, the present paper does not use an equilibrium re…nement criterion (or assume …rms communicate prior to taking actions, which coalition-proofness necessitates). Instead, we consider a generalization of the usual cost speci…cation, allowing for sunk costs of excess capacity. It turns out that when additional capacity is always costly (A1), only Cournot prices (and outputs) may occur in SFC equilibria.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Given a pro…le of supply-schedules which a …rm expects its rivals to choose, it can always alter its own supply-schedule so as to keep the same market price and individual sales as before, but eliminate any excess capacity, thereby reducing costs and increasing pro…ts. Thus, pro…t-maximizing supply schedules must equalize sales and the capacity level, which ensures that the best-response dynamics of the SFC game is analogous to the Cournot one (the role of Cournot quantity played by the SFC sales / capacity level).
The result also mirrors those of Moreno and Ubeda [2006] (MU), who consider a choice of capacity at stage one followed by setting a reservation price, which amounts to constructing a discontinuous one-step supply schedule over the two stages of the game. However, unlike in both DM and MU, here the supply-schedules can be multi-step discontinuous, which permits additional applications of the model. For instance, sellers in on-line auctions can set several one-unit auctions with di¤erent reservation prices, which is equivalent to setting a step-wise supply schedule with several steps. In addition, unlike DM and MU, the present model will apply to situations in which there is no prior communication between players, and no knowledge of others'prior capacity decisions.
We now turn to the other main result of the paper, namely extending the correspondence between SFC and Cournot by means of iterated weak dominance.
To this end, let X i denote the strategy set of player i in G C , and let Y i denote the strategy set of player i in G. Let G 
In other words, every supply schedule in G 0 corresponds to some quantity in G 0 C , and vice-versa, in the sense that the …rms'sales, pro…ts and the market clearing price for a given pro…le of strategies in G 0 (respectively G 0 C ) are the same as they would have been for a corresponding pro…le of strategies in G 0 C (resp. G 0 ). A player's choice in G 0 is the same as in G 0 C , except for a possible duplication of strategies, when multiple supply schedules correspond to the same Cournot strategy, and so always yield the same payo¤s. Hence, the two games are strategically equivalent.
We will use the term 'iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies'(IEWDS) in the usual sense, and say that G 0 (or G 0 C ) is an outcome of IEWDS from G (resp. G C ), when it is obtained by IEWDS from G (resp. G C ), but no further strategies are weakly dominated in G 0 (resp. G 0 C ) Proposition 3.2 Suppose assumption (A2) holds and, in addition:
We then have:
1. For any G 0 being an outcome of IEWDS from G, there exists a G In other words, for every outcome of IEWDS from the SFC game, there is a corresponding equivalent outcome of IEWDS from Cournot, and vice-versa. Thus, under the conditions speci…ed in Proposition 3.2, given avoidance of weakly dominated strategies and common knowledge of rationality, the two games (G and G C ) are strategically equivalent.
Under assumption (1), the LHS of (5) is the lowest possible marginal revenue of an individual …rm from selling more output (as it corresponds to a case where everyone already sell up to q c , and are willing to do so even as the …rm's increase in output leads to a reduced market price). Likewise, under (A2) the RHS is the highest possible marginal cost of selling more output without increasing the maximum quantity s i ( p), or the required capacity, of the supply schedule. Hence, condition (5) implies that even when rivals want to sell their output regardless of the price, it pays o¤ to be equally competitive, making …xed-quantity schedules optimal regardless of what others do. Condition (5) holds when n; q c and C x ( ) ; the marginal cost of extra sales (or cost-saving from a marginal sales reduction), are not too big. In particular, C x ( ) is small when costs depend mostly on the required capacity level s i ( p), and not on actual sales, i.e. when the capacity costs are 'sunk'. The intuition for this is that, on the one hand, the main advantage of quantity competition à la Cournot is that it eliminates the cost of excess capacity. This is because players …x the exact amounts they will sell, and so are able to build only the capacity that they actually need, which is particularly important when the capacity costs are 'sunk'. On the other hand, a greater number of players and higher maximum capacity add to strategic uncertainty about the other players'total output. Hence, this makes Cournot strategies less advantageous compared to more ‡exible supply-functions, because the latter can prepare the player for various aggregate supply / market price scenarios. Thus, more …rms and relaxed capacity constraints make the equivalence between Cournot and SFC in terms of IEWDS more di¢ cult to obtain.
Concluding Remarks
The paper provided a new link between the Cournot model and competition in supply functions, by considering a possibility that …rms must build su¢ cient capacity to produce any quantity that may be prescribed by the chosen supply schedule. In contrast with existing literature, there is no assumption of prior communication between players or knowledge of others'prior capacity decisions. Moreover, the …rms' supply schedules need not be continuous, which makes the model applicable to a wider range of real-world situations. Lastly, the paper established a one-to-one correspondence not only between the sets of Nash Equilibria of the two games in question, but also, under certain conditions, between the sets of strategies that survive the process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. This provides support not only for the Cournot equilibrium outcome, but also for quantity competition in general, as a reduced form of competition in supply functions.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose s = s j ( ) j2N is a pro…le of supply functions, and p is the associated market-clearing price. We will …rst prove that for any i 2 N such that x i (s ) < s i ( p), it is possible for player i to pro…tably deviate from her strategy s i ( ). Suppose that, in addition to x i (s ) < s i ( p) for some i 2 N , we have S N (s ; p ) . Suppose now player i changes her supply schedule to a s
, we know that:
Hence, given the new pro…le of supply functions s 0 = s 0 i ( ) [ s j ( ) j2N nfig , and from the fact that S N nfig (s ; p ) = S N nfig (s 0 ; p ) and S N nfig (s ; p ) = S N nfig (s 0 ; p ) we have:
Hence, p is still the market-clearing price under s 0 ; and 
Suppose then player i switches to an alternative supply schedule s
, which means p is still the market-clearing price under s 0 , and x i (s 0 ) = x i (s ). However, we have:
Given assumption (A1) holds and using x i (s ) < s i ( p), this means costs are lower under s 0 i ( ) than under s i ( ), making the pro…t of …rm i larger in the former case. Hence, any player i 2 N who sets a supply schedule s i ( ) such that x i (s ) < s i ( p) ; can bene…t by unilaterally deviating to an alternative supply schedule s
Consequently, any Nash Equilibrium strategy pro…le s must satisfy x i (s ) = s i ( p) for all i 2 N . Suppose then q N E is a Cournot Nash Equilibrium quantity, i.e. we have q N E = q BR ((n 1) q N E ), where q BR (Q) is the Cournot best-response to an aggregate quantity Q produced by all other players. Consider a pro…le of supply schedules s = s j ( ) j2N such that for every j 2 N we have s j (p) = q N E for all p > 0. This means j (s ) = P (n q N E ) q N E C (q N E ) for all j 2 N , i.e. pro…ts are equal to the Cournot Nash Equilibrium ones. Thus, an optimal deviation by player i from s i ( ) must entail a supply schedule s
e. it would equal the Cournot pro…t given quantity s 0 i ( p) when others produce (n 1) q N E in total. Thus, it cannot exceed the pro…t resulting from s i ( ) due to s i ( p) = q BR ((n 1) q N E ) being the Cournot best-response quantity. As a result, the Nash Equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game is also a NE outcome of the supply-function competition game. Conversely, suppose a pro…le of supply schedules s = s j ( ) j2N is a NE of the supply-function competition game, which means it must satisfy
Suppose further that we do not have s i ( p) = q N E for all i 2 N; where q N E is a Cournot Nash Equilibrium quantity: It must then be the case that for some i 2 N and some q 0 6 = s i ( p) we have:
Hence, by deviating from
its payo¤ in the supply-function game, i.e. s is not a Nash Equilibrium if it does not implement a Cournot Nash Equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Consider a strategy pro…le s = s j ( ) j2N such that for some i 2 N we have x i (s ) < s i ( p), and a strategy s
In the …rst part of the proof, we will show that under the condition stated in the proposition we then have
0 (note that we must have p (s 0 ) > 0, since condition (5) together with assumption (A2) imply
where p is the market-clearing price associated with s 0 ; i.e. one that satis…es
The market-clearing price under s cannot be smaller than p ; since S N (s ; p) S N (s 0 ; p) and
Hence, as supply schedules are non-decreasing, the demand allocated to other players cannot be smaller than Q i . This means:
We proceed to show that the RHS of the above inequality is strictly smaller than c i (q i ; Q i ). A su¢ cient condition for this is that @^ i =@q i is non-negative for all and strictly positive for somê
We have:
and, by virtue of assumptions (1) and (A2) :
where the inequality is strict forq i 2 [x i (s ) ; q i ) ; and the RHS of the inequality is non-negative by virtue of the condition imposed in the proposition. Thus, we have shown that i (s 0 ) > i (s ).
As a result, observe that we can conduct IEWDS in G until we end up with a restricted game G 0 such that:
1. for any strategy pro…le s that is part of G 0 we have We proceed to show the converse, i.e. that for any restricted game obtained from G by IEWDS, there exists an equivalent restricted game obtained from G C by the same process. By virtue of what was shown above, any restricted game G that remains after completing the process of IEWDS in G, must satisfy x i (s ) = s i ( p) for all i 2 N and any strategy pro…le s in G .
Consider then the …rst round of IEWDS in G after which for some q 2 [0; q c ] ; i 2 N there exists no s i ( ) in the resulting restricted game G 0 such that s i ( p) = q. In particular, this means strategy s i ( ) such that s i (p) = q for all p > 0 must have already been eliminated, being weakly dominated by some other strategy s Under condition (1) ; the last inequality must be strict for at least some Q i 2 [0; (n 1) q c ], i.e. quantity q must be weakly dominated by quantity s 0 i ( p) in G C . Thus, one could eliminate q from G C to obtain a restricted game G 0 C such that G 0 C G 0 .
One could then apply the same reasoning again, and consider the …rst round of IEWDS in G after which for some i 2 N; q 0 2 [0; q c ] ; q 0 6 = q there exists no s i ( ) in the resulting restricted game G 00 such that s i ( p) = q 0 . Repeating the same steps would show that it is then possible to remove q 0 from the set of strategies available to player i in G 0 C ; to obtain a further restricted game G 00 C such that G 00 C G 00 .
The process could be repeated until such time that it is impossible to eliminate any further strategies from G, and G is the restricted game that remains. Correspondingly, there will then exist a G C , obtained from G C by IEWDS, such that G G C . Clearly, there may not exist two quantities q; q 0 in G C such that q weakly dominates q 0 in G C . If this was the case, then a strategy s i ( ) such that s i (p) = q for all p > 0 would weakly dominate a strategy s 0 i ( ) such that s 0 i (p) = q 0 for all p > 0.
As both s i ( ) and s 0 i ( ) would be part of G by virtue of G G C , this would then contradict the fact that G is what remains after the IEWDS process is complete. Thus, we have shown that for any restricted game obtained from G by IEWDS, there exists an equivalent restricted game obtained from G C by the same process.
